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Abstract:  
We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment for a sticky price model with 
monopolistic competition when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower 
bound causes the model to be nonlinear due to an occasionally binding constraint. A 
calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates 
more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound: rational agents anticipate 
the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and thereby amplify the effects of 
adverse shocks. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to 
entail zero nominal interest rates, real rate shocks plausibly lead to a binding lower bound 
under optimal policy. This, however, occurs quite infrequently given the variability of U.S. 
real rate shocks during past 2 decades. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks 
requires to alter the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks. 
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New Keynesian 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies optimal monetary policy taking into account that nominal
interest rates cannot be set to negative values.1 Considerable attention has
recently been given to the policy implications of the lower bound on nominal
interest rates, since these in major world economies are either already at or
getting closer to zero.
A situation in which nominal interest rates are close to zero is gener-
ally deemed problematic as the inability to further lower them can lead to
higher than desired real interest rates. In particular, it is often feared that
when agents hold deﬂationary expectations the economy might embark on
ad e ﬂationary path, sometimes referred to as a ‘liquidity trap’, with high
real interest rates generating demand shortfalls and thereby fulﬁlling the
expectations of falling prices.
We consider optimal monetary policy under commitment in a micro-
founded model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices in the prod-
uct market (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003)).
While the model we employ has been widely used to study optimal mone-
tary policy and short-run ﬂuctuations, we seem to be the ﬁrst to analyze
it on a fully stochastic setup that takes into account the zero lower bound.
This is of interest because, as we show, the presence of shocks generates
qualitatively new features of optimal monetary policy that do not appear
when either ignoring the lower bound or assuming perfect foresight. In ad-
dition, a stochastic model can be calibrated to real world economies. This
allows us to assess the quantitative implications of the zero lower bound for
U.S. monetary policy.
We should mention that solving the stochastic rational expectations equi-
librium of our model is not trivial as it involves occasionally binding con-
straints.2 Our numerical technique is based on the insights of Marcet and
Marimon (1998) and requires solving for the functional ﬁxedpoint of a gen-
eralized Bellman equation. To our knowledge we are the ﬁrst to solve for
the saddle point function that solves this Bellman equation. While our so-
lution method is complementary to the approach of Christiano and Fisher
1In principle negative nominal rates are feasible, e.g., if one is willing to give up free
convertability of deposits and other ﬁnancial assets into cash or if one could levy a tax
on money holdings, see Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003), Goodfriend (2000). However,
these policy measures are generally considered to be practically inapplicable.
2Our model has four state variables with continuous support.
1(2000) that is based on ﬁrst order conditions, it has the paramount advan-
tage that we can check whether second order conditions hold. In particular,
we numerically verify the saddle point property of our solution which is a
suﬃcient condition for having found a constrained maximum.
Two qualitatively new features of optimal policy emerge from this anal-
ysis.
First, we ﬁnd that nominal interest rates are lowered more aggressively
in response to a fall in the natural real interest rate than what is suggested
instead by a model without lower bound.3 Such ‘preemptive’ easing of nom-
inal rates is optimal because agents anticipate the possibility of binding real
rate shocks in the future and reduce their output and inﬂation expectations
correspondingly. Such expectations end up amplifying the adverse eﬀects
of real rate shocks and thereby trigger a stronger policy response. Since
this will cause the bound to be hit earlier, there exists a complementarity
between private sector expectations and the optimal policy reaction to such
expectations.4
Second, the presence of real rate shocks that cause the zero lower bound
to bind also alters the optimal policy reaction to (non-binding) mark-up
shocks. This occurs because the policymaker cannot aﬀect the average real
interest rate in any stationary equilibrium, therefore, faces a ‘global’ policy
constraint. The inability to lower nominal and real interest rates as much
as desired then requires that optimal policy increases rates less (or lowers
rates more) in response to non-binding shocks compared to the policy that
would be optimal in the absence of the lower bound.
T h e r ea r ea l s oan u m b e ro fquantitative results regarding optimal U.S.
monetary policy and the relevance of the zero lower bound emerging from
this analysis.
First, the zero lower bound appears inessential in dealing with mark-up
shocks, i.e., variations over time in the degree of monopolistic competition
between ﬁrms.5 More precisely, the empirical magnitude of mark-up shocks
in the U.S. economy observable for the period 1983-2002 is too small for
3The natural real rate is the real interest rate associated with the optimal use of
productive resources under ﬂexible prices.
4Although we do not formally show the existence of sunspot equilibria, this comple-
mentarity may be troublesome for policy making in practice.
5These shocks are sometimes called ‘cost-push’ shocks, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999).
2the zero-lower bound to become binding. This would remain the case even
when the true variance of mark-up shocks were threefold above our estimated
value.
Second, the shocks to the ‘natural’ real rate of interest may cause the
lower bound to become binding, but this happens relatively infrequently
and is a feature of optimal policy. Based on our estimates for the 1983-2002
period, in the U.S. economy the bound would be expected to bind on average
in about one quarter every 17 years under optimal policy.6 Moreover, once
zero nominal interest rates are observed they are expected to endure on
average not more than 1 to 2 quarters. Also, the average welfare losses
entailed by the zero lower bound seem rather small for the U.S. economy.
The latter results, however, are sensitive to the size of the standard
deviation of the estimated real rate process. In particular, we ﬁnd that
zero nominal rates would occur much more frequently and generate higher
welfare losses if the real rate process had a somewhat larger variance.
Third, as argued by Jung, Teranishi, and Watanbe (2001) and Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003) optimal policy reacts to a binding zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates by creating inﬂationary expectations in the form
of a commitment to let future output gaps and inﬂation rates increase above
zero. The policymaker thereby eﬀectively lowers the real interest rates that
agents are confronted with. Since reducing real rates using inﬂation is costly
(in welfare terms), the policymaker has to trade-oﬀ the losses generated by
too high real rates with those stemming from higher inﬂation rates.
We ﬁnd that the required levels of inﬂation and the associated positive
output gap are very moderate. A negative 3 standard deviation shock to the
natural real rate requires a promise of an increase in the annual inﬂation
rate in the order of 15 basis points and a positive output gap of roughly
0.5%.
Finally, while the optimal policy response to shocks through the promise
of above average output and inﬂation may in principal generate a ‘commit-
ment bias’, the quantitative eﬀects turn out to be negligible. This holds not
only for our baseline calibration but also for a range of alternative model
6Clearly, under sub-optimal policy this might occur more or less frequently.
3parameterizations. It suggests that optimal policy for the U.S. economy im-
plements an average inﬂation rate of zero even when taking direct account
of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.7
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy
discusses the related literature. Thereafter, section 3 introduces the model
and the policy problem. In section 4 we prove the model’s ability to generate
a ‘liquidity trap’, i.e., deﬂation and negative output gaps in the presence of
zero nominal interest rates. Section 5 presents our calibration for the U.S.
economy and explains how the historical shock processes were identiﬁed.
The solution method we employ is described in section 6. Section 7 presents
our main results on optimal monetary policy with lower bound for the U.S.
economy. We then discuss in section 8 the robustness of our ﬁndings to
various parameter changes, and brieﬂy conclude in section 9.
2 Related Literature
A number of recent papers study the implications for optimal monetary
policy of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
Most closely related is Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) who consider
a perfect foresight economy and analytically derive optimal targeting rules
with a lower bound. In this paper we consider a fully stochastic setup
and solve the model numerically. A stochastic setup has two important
advantages. First, it allows for the possibility that shocks drive the economy
from a non-binding region into a region where the lower bound is binding.
This allows to assess how policy should be conducted in the ’run-up’ to a
binding situation. Secondly, a stochastic setup allows us to calibrate the
model to actual economies and to study the quantitative importance of the
zero lower bound for the conduct of monetary policy in practice.
A related set of papers focuses on optimal monetary policy in the ab-
sence of credibility. In a companion paper Adam and Billi (2003) derive the
nonlinear optimal policy under discretion for a stochastic New Keynesian
model calibrated to the U.S. economy. Instead, Eggertsson (2003) analyzes
discretionary policy and the role of nominal debt policy as an instrument to
achieve credibility.
7Zero inﬂation is optimal because it minimizes the price dispersion between ﬁrms with
sticky prices and we abstract from the money demand distortions associated with positive
nominal interest rates.
4The performance of simple monetary policy rules is examined by Fuhrer
and Madigan (1997), Orphanides and Wieland (1998), and Wolman (2003).
Am a i nﬁnding of these papers is that if the targeted inﬂation rate is close
enough to zero policy rules formulated in terms of inﬂation rates, e.g., the
Taylor rule (1993), can generate signiﬁcant real distortions. Reifschneider
and Williams (2000) and Wolman (2003) show that simple policy rules for-
mulated in terms of a price level target can signiﬁcantly reduce these real
distortions associated with the zero lower bound on interest rates. Benhabib
et al. (2002) study the global properties of Taylor-type rules showing that
these might lead to self-fulﬁlling deﬂations that converge to a low inﬂation
or deﬂationary steady state. Evans and Honkapohja (2003) study the prop-
erties of global Taylor rules under adaptive learning, showing the existence
of an additional steady state with even lower inﬂation rates.
The role of the exchange rate and monetary-base rules in overcoming the
adverse aﬀects of a binding lower bound on interest rates is analyzed, e.g.,
by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003), Coenen and Wieland (2003), McCallum
(2003), and Svensson (2003).8
3 The Model
We consider a simple and well known monetary policy model based on a
representative consumer and ﬁrms in monopolistic competition facing re-
strictions on the frequency of price adjustments (Calvo (1983)). Following
Rotemberg (1987) this is often referred to as the ‘New Keynesian’ model and
has frequently been studied in the literature, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler
(1999) and Woodford (2003).
3.1 Private Sector
The behavior of the private sector is described by two linearized equations.9
On the one hand, proﬁt maximizing price setting behavior by ﬁrms implies
an ‘aggregate supply’ (AS) equation of the form
πt = βEtπt+1 + λyt + ut (1)
8Further articles dealing with the relevance of the zero lower bound can be found in
the special issues of the Journal of Japanese and International Economies Vol. 14, 2000
and the Journal of Money Credit and Banking Vol. 32 (4,2), 2000.
9We justify the use of linearized equations in section 3.3.3 based on the computational
complexity of numerically solving the model.
5where πt denotes the inﬂation rate from period t − 1 to t and yt is the
deviation of output from its natural rate.10 The shock ut captures the
stochastic variation in the degree of substitutability between diﬀerent goods
that leads to variation in the mark-up charged by ﬁrms.11 The parameter
β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and λ > 0 indicates how strong is the
reaction of inﬂation to deviations of output from its natural rate.
On the other hand, the Euler equation describing households’ optimal
labor and consumption decisions delivers an ‘IS curve’ of the form
yt = Etyt+1 − ϕ(it − Etπt+1)+gt (2)
where it denotes the nominal interest rate (in deviation from the interest
rate consistent with the zero inﬂation steady state) and ϕ > 0 is the interest
rate elasticity of output. The shock gt captures the variation in the ‘natural’
real interest rate, i.e.,
gt = ϕ(rt − r∗) (3)
where rt i st h er e a lr a t ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h eﬂexible price equilibrium and
r∗ =1 /β −1 is the real rate of the deterministic zero inﬂation steady state.
The shock gt summarizes all shocks that generate time variation in the
real interest rate under ﬂexible prices, therefore, captures the combined
eﬀects of preference shocks, productivity shocks, and changes in government
expenditure.12
The laws of motion of the shocks are assumed to be given by
ut = ρuut−1 + εu,t (4)
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t (5)
with ρj ∈ (−1,1) and εj,t ∼ iiN(0,σ2
j) for j = u,g. As will be shown in
the following sections, this speciﬁcation of the shock processes is suﬃciently
general to describe the historical sequence of shocks in the U.S. economy for
the period 1983:1-2002:4 that we consider.
10The natural rate of output is the output level that would emerge if prices were ﬂexible.
11See Steinsson (2003) for details.
12See chapter 4.1 in Woodford (2003) for details.
63.2 Monetary Authority
We suppose that the monetary authority controls the short-term nominal
interest rate it, but control is subject to a lower bound that emerges from
t h ep r e s e n c eo fm o n e yt h a to ﬀers a zero nominal return. This implies that
nominal interest rates are non-negative, which in terms of our notation is
captured by the restriction
it ≥− r∗. (6)
We further assume that the monetary authority uses nominal interest rates
to maximize the welfare of the representative agent. As shown in Woodford













where the weight α > 0 depends on the underlying preference and technology
parameters.
Intuitively, the welfare function captures the following two eﬀects. Firstly,
output gaps are ineﬃcient because they denote deviations of output from
the (approximately eﬃcient) natural rate of output. Secondly, inﬂation is
ineﬃcient because it generates price dispersion between ﬁrms that cannot
perfectly adjust prices, thereby induces socially ineﬃcient substitution be-
tween the goods produced by diﬀerent entrepreneurs.13
Therefore, the monetary policy problem is the following
13Substitution is socially ineﬃcient because ﬁrms face increasing marginal costs of pro-















πt = βEtπt+1 + λyt + ut (9)
yt = Etyt+1 − ϕ(it − Etπt+1)+gt (10)
it ≥− r∗ (11)
ut = ρuut−1 + εu,t (12)
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t (13)
u0, g0 given
Note that besides setting interest rates, the monetary authority is allowed
to ‘choose’ the associated output gaps and inﬂation rates. This implies
that whenever there exist multiple rational expectations equilibria consis-
tent with a given interest rate policy the economy coordinates on the welfare
superior equilibrium. As shown in Woodford and Giannoni (2003) such co-
ordination may be achieved by conditioning policy on endogenous variables
in an appropriate way.
3.3 Discussion
3.3.1 Money demand distortions
The objective function (7) does not contain any element capturing the dis-
tortionary eﬀects of positive nominal interest rates, an issue that has been
emphasized by Milton Friedman. It thus implicitly assumes that real money
balances are of negligible importance (in utility terms) and the distortion
generated by positive nominal interest rates can be abstracted from. One
may interpret this in the sense of a cash-less limit economy, as in Woodford
(1998).
We note that the neglect of money balances, in any case, does not seem to
entail a signiﬁcant approximation error. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003a),
e.g., ﬁnd that price level stability should indeed be the overriding policy
objective in the presence of sticky prices, even when taking into account the
distortions generated by positive nominal interest rates.
83.3.2 Policy instruments
By assuming that the interest rate is the only available policy instrument
we deliberately abstract from a number of alternative policy channels, most
notably ﬁscal policy, exchange rate policy, and quantity-based monetary
policies.
While the omission of ﬁscal policies clearly constitutes a shortcoming
that ought to be addressed in future work, ignoring exchange rate and money
policies may be less severe than one might initially think. Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (2001), for example, show that one can reinterpret the present
model as an open economy model and there exists a one-to-one mapping be-
tween interest rate policies and exchange rate policies. It is then inessential
whether policy is formulated in terms of interest rates or exchange rates.
Similarly, ignoring quantity-oriented monetary policies in the form of open
market operations during periods of zero nominal interest rates seems to be
of little relevance. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show that in the present
model such policies have no eﬀect on the equilibrium unless they inﬂuence
the future path of interest rates.
We recognize that alternative policy instruments may still be relevant
in practice.14 Focusing on interest rate policy in isolation is nevertheless of
considerable interest as it allows to assess what interest rate policy alone can
achieve in avoiding liquidity traps and whether there is any need for employ-
ing alternative instruments. This seems important to know, given that these
alternative instruments are often subject to (potentially uncertain) political
approval by external authorities and may therefore not be readily available.
3.3.3 How much non-linearity?
Instead of the fully nonlinear model, we use linear approximations to the ﬁrst
order conditions, i.e., equations (1) and (2), and a quadratic approximation
to the objective function, i.e., equation (7). Doing so means that the only
nonlinearity that we take account of is the one imposed by the zero lower
bound (6). Technically, this approach is equivalent to linearizing the ﬁrst
order conditions of the nonlinear Ramsey problem around the ﬁrst best
steady state except for the non-negativity constraint for nominal interest
rates that is kept in its original nonlinear form. This approximation is valid
for small shocks and whenver the steady state interest rate is suﬃciently
14See Eggertsson (2003) on how other policy instruments, e.g., nominal debt policy, may
be used as a commitment device.
9close to the zero lower bound, i.e., when the quarterly discount factor β is
suﬃciently close to one.
Clearly, this modelling approach has advantages and disadvantages. One
disadvantage is that for the empirical shock support and the actual value
of the discount factor the linearizations (1) and (2) may perform poorly.
However, this depends on the degree of nonlinearity present in the economy,
an issue about which relatively little seems to be known empirically.
A paramount advantage of our approach is that one can economize in the
dimension of the state space. A fully nonlinear setup would require instead
an additional state to keep track over time of the higher-order eﬀects of price
dispersion, as shown by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003b). Computation
costs would become prohibitive with an additional state.15
A further advantage of focusing on the nonlinearities induced by the
lower bound only is that one does not have to parameterize higher order
terms when applying the model to the U.S. economy. This seem important,
given the lack of evidence about the empirical importance of such terms.
Finally, the simpler setup implies that our results remain more easily
comparable to the standard linear-quadratic analysis without lower bound
as the only diﬀerence consists of imposing equation (6).
4 Zero Bound and Liquidity Traps
In this section we assess the suitability of the simple model described in
the previous section for studying issues related to the zero lower bound and
‘liquidity traps’.
We believe that a minimum requirement of any model used to analyze
these issues is that it should be able to replicate the Japanese experience
of the 1990s, i.e., low nominal interest rates, deﬂation, and negative output
gaps. It is precisely the apparent existence of such unfavorable ‘liquidity
trap equilibria’ that causes the zero lower bound to be of economic interest.
For this reason we determine the set of Rational Expectations Equilibria
(REE) consistent with equations (1) and (2) when it ≡− r∗,i . e . ,w h e nn o m -
15For our version of the model we have 4 state variables with continuous support. We
need a considerable amount of (collocation) nodes along most of the dimensions to appro-
priately capture the kinds in the policy functions. The models with occasionally binding
constraints analyzed by Christiano and Fisher (2000) had one or two state variables at
most.
10inal interest rates are at their lower bound.16’17 We then analyze whether
there exist REE that display properties associated with a liquidity trap, as
deﬁned above. In the appendix the following result is derived:
Proposition 1 (R E Ew i t hZ e r oB o u n d ) Suppose it = −r∗ for all t.T h e
full set of Rational Expectations Equilibria for the model described by equa-
tions (1) and (2) is given by
• a continuum of locally explosive solutions, possibly involving sunspots,
where either output is positive and inﬂation negative or output negative
and inﬂation positive.










































and the sunspot variable st ∈ R1 is an arbitrary martingale diﬀerence
series, φ ∈ (0,1),a n dω > 0.
Clearly, the locally explosive solutions mentioned in proposition 1 seem
inadequate explanations of liquidity traps, as either inﬂation or output are
increasing.18 Moreover, such equilibria are Pareto dominated by the sta-
tionary equilibria since the rate of growth of output or inﬂation is (locally)
larger than 1/β, see the appendix.
The situation is diﬀerent for the stationary solutions (14).19 Since the
coeﬃcients in the respective columns of Γ have the same sign, when interest
16When β is suﬃciently close to one the linearization of equations (1) and (2) remains




β − 1 → 0 as β → 1.
17We assume transversality conditions to be satisﬁed. Subsequent footnotes discuss
various aspects of this assumption.
18Since we use a linearized model, these variables need not increase without bound in
the underlying fully nonlinear model, i.e. one cannot rule out such equilibria based on
feasibility arguments. Yet, provided the solutions exist in the nonlinear model, they will
display either high inﬂation or high output and are therefore unable to replicate a liquidity
trap.
19As argued in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) such solutions statisfy the transversality
constraint if ﬁscal policy contracts the stock of outstanding goverment debt at a suﬃcient
rate. This is the case, for example, if ﬁscal policy is Ricardian.
11rates are at their lower bound mark-up shocks and demand shocks can give
rise to both low output and low inﬂation. Clearly, similar phenomena may
be generated by sunspot shocks, since ω > 0. Solutions of the form (14),
thus, have the potential to replicate the Japanese experience of the recent
years.
In the remaining part of the paper we will focus on stationary funda-
mental equilibria. These equilibria Pareto dominate explosive equilibria and
any equilibria involving sunspots, and may generate equilibrium paths re-
sembling liquidity traps. Moreover, since the stationary fundamental solu-
tion is locally isolated among the set of fundamental rational expectations
solutions, learning dynamics may be expected to select the stationary so-
lution instead of the explosive solutions, as in the analysis of Evans and
Honkapohja (2003) with a related model.
As a ﬁnal remark, we should point out that the model is globally stable,
in the sense that there always exist feasible interest rate policies consis-
tent with a stationary equilibrium path. This diﬀers from earlier studies,
e.g., Orphanides and Wieland (2000), in which for some realizations of the
shocks the economy possesses only destabilizing equilibria. The global sta-
bility property of the present set up, however, might be sensitive to the
introduction of lagged inﬂation terms in the price setting equation (1), a
question that would have to be explored in future work.
5 Model Calibration
To asses the quantitative importance of the zero lower bound for monetary
policy in the U.S. economy we need to assign values to the model parameters.
In particular we must choose parameter values for the coeﬃcients appearing
in equations (8), (9), (10), (12) and (13).
Table 1 summarizes our parameterization for the U.S. economy. The
values for α, λ,a n dϕ are taken from table 6.1 in Woodford (2003), based
in turn on Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). Instead, the parameters of the
shock processes and the discount factor are estimated using U.S. data for
the period 1983:1-2002:4.
12Parameter Economic interpretation Assigned value






α weight on output in the loss function 0.048
42 =0 .003
λ slope of the AS curve 0.024
ϕ real rate elasticity of output 6.25
ρu AR-coeﬃcient mark-up shocks 0
ρg AR-coeﬃcient real rate shocks 0.8
σu s.d. mark-up innovations (quarterly %) 0.154
σg s.d. real rate innovations (quarterly %) 1.524
Table 1: Parameter values (baseline calibration)
The estimation procedure follows Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). We
ﬁrst construct output and inﬂation expectations by estimating expectation
functions from the data. Then we plug these expectations along with actual
values of the output gap and inﬂation into equations (1) and (2) and identify
the shocks ut and gt with the equation residuals.
We measure output by linearly detrended log real GDP, and inﬂation
by the log quarterly diﬀerence of the implicit deﬂator.20 Detrended output
is depicted in ﬁgure 1. For the interest rate we use the quarterly average
of the fed funds rate in deviation from the average real rate for the whole
sample, which is approximately equal to 3.5% (in annual terms). Based on
this latter estimate we set the quarterly discount factor shown in table 1.21
All variables used are expressed in percentage terms. When presenting
results we transform quarterly inﬂation rates and interest rates into annual
rates.22
The expectations in equations (1) and (2) are constructed from the pre-
dictions of an unconstrained VAR in output, inﬂation, and the fed funds
20The data is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis: www.bea.gov. Using
quadratically detrended GDP or HP(1600)-ﬁltered GDP leaves the estimated parameters
of the shock processes virtually unchanged.
21We implicitely assume that the positive inﬂation rates displayed in the sample did
not aﬀect the real rate so that the nominal interest rate in the zero inﬂation steady state
remains equal to this real rate.
22The computations, however, use quarterly interest rates and inﬂation rates.
13rate with three lags.23 The correlations of the VAR residuals are depicted in
ﬁgure 2. Substituting these VAR predictions for the expectations in equa-
tions (1) and (2) one can then identify the shocks ut and gt. The implied
s h o c ks e r i e sa r es h o w ni nﬁgure 3.
While the mark-up shocks ut seem to be close to white noise, the real
rate shocks gt are rather persistent. As one would expect, the real rate seems
to fall during recessions, e.g., at the beginning of the 1990’s and at the start
of the new millennium. Fitting univariate AR(1) processes to these shocks
delivers the following estimates24
ρu =0 .129 (0.113)
ρg =0 .919 (0.050)
σu =0 .153
σg =1 .091
The estimated value of ρu is insigniﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance lev-
els.25 For this reason we use ρu =0and set the standard deviation of
the innovations εu,t so as to match the standard deviation of the identiﬁed
m a r k - u ps h o c k s ,w h i c hi sa p p r o x i m a t e l ye q u a lt o0.61% annually.
T h ee s t i m a t eo fρg indicates that real rate shocks are highly persistent.26
The implied annual standard deviation of the real rate, as implicitly deﬁned
in equation (3), is equal to 1.63%.27 Although real rate shocks seem quite
23Estimating expectations functions in such a way is justiﬁed as long as there are no
structural breaks in the economy. Since our sample period, 1983:1-2002:4, starts after
the disinﬂation policy under Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, monetary policy
is expected to have been reasonably stable, see Clarida et al. (2000). A VAR lag order
selection test based on the Akaike information criterion with a maximum of 6 lags suggests
the inclusion of 3 lags. A Wald lag exclusion test indicates that the third lags are jointly
signiﬁcant at the 2% level.
24Numbers in brackets are the standard errors of the point estimates. The univariate
AR(1) describe the shock processes ut and gt quite well. In particular, there is no signif-
icant autocorrelation left in the innovations εi,t (i = u,g). Also when estimating AR(2)
processes the additional lags remain insigniﬁcant.
25This contrast with Ireland (2002) who uses data starting in 1948:1. Extending our
sample back to this date would also lead to highly persistent mark-up shocks. Since we do
not argue that monetary policy has been constant across the extended sample, we choose
the shorter period commencing in 1983:1.
26This is similar to the results in Ireland (2002).
27When using instead the period 1979:4-1995:2 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998),
which includes the volatile years 1980-1982, we ﬁnd for the estimated real rate process an
annual standard deviation of 2.57%.
14persistent, the persistence drops considerably once one uses future actual
values to identify output and inﬂation expectations in equations (1) and
(2).28 The estimated autoregressive coeﬃcient for the real rate shocks then
drops to ρg =0 .794 which indicates that forecasts that are better than
our simple VAR-predictions would most likely lead to a reduction in the
estimated persistence.29 For this reason we set ρg =0 .8 in our calibration.30
Finally, the standard deviation of the innovations εg,t in table 1 is chosen
again so as to keep the unconditional standard deviation of the calibrated
real shock process equal to the standard deviation of the identiﬁed shock
values.
6S o l v i n g t h e M o d e l
Due to the presence of the zero lower bound analytical results for optimal
interest rate policy are unavailable. For this reason we have to rely on
numerical methods.
An important complication that arises, however, is that the policy-
maker’s maximization problem (8) fails to be recursive, since constraints
(9) and (10) involve forward-looking variables. For this reason dynamic
programming techniques cannot be applied directly; these assume transi-
tion equations that do not involve expectation terms. To obtain a dynamic
programming formulation of problem (8) we apply the technique of Marcet
and Marimon (1998) and reformulate the problem as follows:
W(µ1
t,µ 2



















28This amounts to assuming perfect foresight.
29When using VAR-predictions but considering the period 1979:4-1995:2, as in Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1998), the point estimate also drops to ρg =0 .827.
30This value cannot be rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level when using estimates based
on the VAR-expectations. In an earlier version of the paper, which is available upon
request, we used instead the point estimates for ρu and ρg.
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≡− αy2 − π2 + γ1 (π − λy − u) − µ1π
+γ2 (y + ϕi − g) − µ2 1
β (ϕπ + y).
(17)
Problem (16) is fully recursive as all transition equations now involve only
lagged state variables.
A crucial feature of the reformulated problem (16) is that it introduces
two co-state variables (µ1,µ 2) bringing the total number of state variables up
to four. The states (µ1,µ 2) are the lagged values of the Lagrange multipliers
for the constraints (9) and (10), respectively; they can be interpreted as
‘promises’ that have to be kept from past commitments. A negative value
of µ1, e.g., indicates a promise to generate higher inﬂation rates than what
purely forward looking policy would imply.31 Likewise, a negative value of
µ2 indicates a promise to generate higher values of 1
β(ϕπ+y) than suggested
by purely forward looking policy.
We then apply numerical dynamic programming tools to approximate
the value function that solves the recursive saddle point functional equation
(16) and derive the associated policy functions.32 It appears that we are
the ﬁrst to actually solve for the saddle point function of such a recursive
31This follows from the expression of the one-period return function h(·) given in equa-
tion (17).
32In particular, we use the collocation method with cubic splines as basis functions to
approximate the value function solving equation (16). For details on projections methods
and the collocation method see Judd (1998). We iterate on the Bellman equation until the
maximum absolute change in the basis coeﬃcients falls below the square root of machine
precision, i.e., approximately 1.49·10
−8. The accuracy of our numerical solution is then
checked by studying the Bellman equation residuals on a ﬁne grid oﬀ the collocation nodes.
With this procedure and some experimentation, we choose the collocation nodes so as to
minimize on the Bellman equation residuals. Solutions have been computed in MatLab
employing the toolboxes of Miranda and Fackler (2002).
16problem. Our solution method is complementary to the ones studied by
Christiano and Fisher (2000) who focused on ﬁrst order conditions but has
the paramount advantage that it allows to verify second order conditions. In
particular, we numerically check whether the right-hand side of (16) has a
saddlepoint in the variables (γ1
t ,γ2
t ) and (yt,πt,i t), respectively, at the con-
jectured optimal solution. As is well known, e.g. chapter 14.3 in Silberberg
(1990), the saddle point property is a suﬃcient condition for having found
a constrained optimum. The results of this solution approach are reported
in the next sections.
7O p t i m a l P o l i c y w i t h L o w e r B o u n d
This section shows the optimal policy with a lower bound on nominal interest
rates for the model calibrated to the U.S. economy.
Before presenting the results we would like to emphasize that the pres-
ence of the zero lower bound generates nonlinear optimal policies therefore
causes a failure of certainty-equivalence. This has two important implica-
tions. First, the average value of endogenous variables will generally diﬀer
from the steady state value in a way that depends on the nature of the
shocks. Second, the average or expected model dynamics in response to
shocks will diﬀer from the deterministic impulse responses. For this latter
reason we discuss results in terms of the implied ‘mean dynamics’ in response
t os h o c k s ,i n s t e a do ft h em o r ef a m i l i a rdeterministic impulse responses.33
7.1 Optimal Policy Functions
Figure 4 presents the optimal responses of (y,π,i) and the Lagrange multi-
pliers (γ1,γ2) to a mark-up shock and a real rate shock.34 The responses of
the Lagrange multipliers are of interest because they represent commitments
regarding future inﬂation rates and output levels, as explained in the pre-
vious section. Depicted are the optimal policy responses both for the case
of the zero lower bound being imposed (solid line) and for the case when
interest rates are allowed to become negative (dashed line with circles).
33Mean dynamics are identical to impulse responses whenever certainty equivalence
holds, e.g., in the absence of the zero lower bound. We found that in our nonlinear model
the mean dynamics diﬀer considerably from the deterministic impulse responses.
34The state variables not shown on the x-axes are set to their (unconditional) average
values. Policies are shown for a range of ±4 unconditional standard deviations of both
the mark-up shock and real rate shock.
17The left-hand panel of ﬁgure 4 shows that the optimal response to mark-
up shocks is virtually unaﬀected by the presence of the zero lower bound.35
Independently of whether the bound is imposed or not, a positive mark-up
shock lowers output and leads to a promise of future deﬂation, as indicated
by the positive value of γ1. The latter ameliorates the inﬂationary eﬀect
of the shocks through the expectational channel present in equation (1).
To deliver on its promise the policymaker increases nominal interest rates.36
Yet, since the required interest rate changes are rather small, mark-up shocks
do not plausibly lead to a binding lower bound.
The situation is quite diﬀerent when considering the policy response to
a real rate shock, which is shown on the right-hand panel of ﬁgure 4. With-
out zero lower bound these shocks do not generate any policy trade-oﬀ:t h e
required real rate can be implemented through appropriate variations in
the nominal rate alone. Yet, once the lower bound is imposed suﬃciently
negative real rate shocks cause the bound to be binding. Promising future
inﬂation is then the only remaining instrument for implementing reductions
in the real rate. The negative values for γ1 and γ2 reveal that the policy
maker indeed commits to future inﬂation as a substitute for nominal rate
cuts once the lower bound is reached. Yet, since inﬂation is a costly in-
strument (in welfare terms), it would be suboptimal to completely undo the
output losses generated by negative real rate shocks. As a result, there is a
negative output gap, some deﬂation, and nominal interest rates are at their
lower bound. Note that all these features are generally associated with a
‘liquidity trap’.
Figure 5 depicts the optimal interest rate response to real rate shocks in
greater detail. This shows that once the lower bound is taken into account
it is optimal to reduce nominal rates more aggressively than is the case
when nominal rates are allowed to become negative. As a result of this
‘preemptive’ easing of nominal rates the lower bound is reached earlier than
suggested by optimal policy without taking into account the lower bound.37
35The optimal reaction to mark-up shocks is diﬀerent with or without the bound, but
the diﬀerence is quantiatively small for the calibrated parameter values. We will come
back to this point in section 7.4.
36The sign of the optimal interest rate response, however, depends on the degree of
autocorrelation of the mark-up shocks. In particular, with more persistent shocks nominal
rates would optimally decrease in response to a positive mark-up shock.
37Kato and Nishiyama (2003) found a similar eﬀect when using a backward looking AS
curve which suggests that our result is robust to the introduction of lagged inﬂation terms
into the ‘New Keynesian’ AS curve. Using diﬀerent models, Orphanides and Wieland
18A stronger interest rate reduction is optimal because the possibility of a
binding lower bound in the future puts downward pressure on expected
future output and inﬂation, since these variables become negative once the
bound is reached, see the right-hand panel of ﬁgure 4. The reduced output
and inﬂation expectations amplify the eﬀects of negative real rate shocks in
the IS equation (2) and thereby require that the policy maker lowers nominal
rates faster than is the case without lower bound.
This anticipation eﬀect points towards an interesting complementarity
between policy decisions and private sector expectations that may be of
considerable importance for actual policy making. Suppose, e.g., that agents
suddenly assign a larger probability to the lower bound being binding in
the future. This would lower output and inﬂation expectations, and in
turn induces policy to reduce the nominal interest rate thereby causing the
economy to move into the direction of the expected change. This points
towards the existence of possible sunspot ﬂuctuations, an issue that may
have to be explored in future work.
7.2 Dynamic Response to Real Rate Shocks
Figure 6 displays the mean dynamics of the economy in response to real
rate shocks of ±3 unconditional standard deviations.38 With our calibration
the annual ‘natural’ real rate, i.e., the real interest rate consistent with the
eﬃcient use of productive resources, then stands temporarily at +8.39% and
−1.39%, respectively; the interesting case being the one where full use of
productive resources requires a negative real rate.
As argued by Krugman (1998), negative real rates are plausible even
if the marginal product of physical capital remains positive. For instance
agents may require a large equity premium, as historically observed in the
U.S., or the price of physical capital may be expected to decrease.
Figure 6 shows that in response to a negative real rate shock annual
inﬂation rises by about 15 basis points for 3 to 4 quarters and then returns
to a value close to zero. Similarly, output increases slightly above potential
(2000) and Reifschneider and Williams (2000) also report more aggressive easing than in
the absence of the zero bound.
38The initial values for the other states are set equal to their unconditional average
values. Setting them to the conditional average values consistent with the real rate shock
does not make a diﬀerence. The mean dynamics in this and other graphs are the average
responses for 100 thousand stochastic simulations.
19after the second quarter and slowly returns to potential. Getting out of a
‘liquidity trap’ induced by negative real-rate shocks, thus, requires that the
policymaker promises to let future output and inﬂation increase above zero
for a substantial amount of time. The qualitative feature of this ﬁnding has
already been reported in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and in a some-
what diﬀerent form in Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003). Our results clarify,
however, that the required amount of inﬂation and the output boom are
rather modest.
Note, that ex-post there would be strong incentives to increase nominal
interest rates earlier than promised as this would bring both inﬂation and
output closer to their target values. The feasibility of the optimal policy re-
sponse, therefore, crucially depends on the policymaker’s credibility. Wether
policymakers can and want to credibly commit to such policies is currently
subject of debate, see for example Orphanides (2003).
7.3 Frequency of Binding Rates and Welfare Implications
In this section we discuss the frequency with which the zero lower bound
can be expected to bind and welfare implications. It turns out that for the
calibration to the U.S. economy the lower bound binds rather infrequently,
namely in about one quarter every 17 years on average. Moreover, zero nom-
inal interest rates tend to prevail for rather short periods of time (roughly
1.4 quarters on average).
Figure 7 displays the probability with which under optimal policy the
zero bound is binding for n quarters, conditional on it being binding in
quarter one. The likelihood that zero nominal interest rates persist for more
than 4 quarters is 1.8% only. Given that the lower bound is hit rather in-
frequently, possible inﬂation and output biases emerging from the nonlinear
policy functions are expected to be small. In fact, our simulations show
that for the calibration at hand there are virtually no average level eﬀects
for output and inﬂation. Although output and inﬂation are somewhat larger
than zero on average, for both variables the eﬀects are in the order of less
than 0.01%.
Finally, as one would expect, the average welfare eﬀects generated by
the existence of a zero lower bound are rather small. Our simulations show
that the additional welfare losses of the zero lower bound are roughly 1%
20of those generated by the stickiness of prices alone.39 Given that the zero
lower bound is reached rather infrequently, however, this indicates that the
conditional welfare losses associated with being at the lower bound are quite
substantial.
7.4 Global Implications of Binding Shocks
This section reports a qualitatively new ﬁnding that stems from the presence
of binding negative real rate shocks. It turns out that the presence of binding
shocks alters the optimal policy response to non-binding shocks, i.e., the
reaction to positive real rate shocks and mark-up shocks of both signs. In
this sense the existence of a lower bound has global implications on the
shape of the optimal policy functions.
For the parameterization of the U.S. economy given in table 1, however,
these global eﬀects are rather weak, since the lower bound binds rather
infrequently. To illustrate the global eﬀects, in this section we assume that
the variance of the real rate innovations εg,t is threefold the one implied by
the baseline calibration in table 1.40
Figure 8 illustrates the mean response of the real rate to a ±3 standard
deviation real rate shock under optimal policy. The upper panel shows
the case with lower bound and the lower panel depicts the case without
bound. While in the latter case the policy reaction is perfectly symmetric,
imposing the bound creates a sizeable asymmetry: the real rate reduction in
response to a negative shock is much weaker than the corresponding increase
in response to a positive shock.41
Equation (2), however, implies that the policymaker is unable to aﬀect
the average real rate in any stationary equilibrium.42 Therefore, the less





0) from their stationary distributions under optimal policy (with and
without bound) and then evaluate the corresponding welfare losses in the subsequent 1000
periods.
40This value is roughly consistent with the estimated variability of real rate shocks in the
period 1979:4-1995:2, i.e., the time span considered by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
The unconditional variance of the real rate shocks for 1979:4-1995:2 is about 2.5-fold that
for the period 1983:1-2002:4.
41Clearly, this feature emerges because with negative shocks inﬂation must be used to
reduce the real interest rate which is a costly instrument in welfare terms.
42This can be seen by taking unconditional expectations of equation (1), imposing sta-
tionarity, and noting that E[gt]=0 .
21strong real rate decrease has to be compensated with a less strong real
rate increase (or a stronger real rate decrease) in response to other shocks.
Ac l o s el o o ka tﬁgure 8 reveals that this is indeed the case: the real rate
increase with the lower bound falls slightly short of the one implemented
without bound.
Moreover, it is optimal to undo the asymmetry by trading-oﬀ across
all shocks, e.g., also across mark-up shocks. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 9
which plots the economy’s mean response to ±3 standard deviation mark-
up shocks. The left-hand panel illustrates the response when the zero lower
bound is imposed and the right-hand panel depicts the case without bound.
Clearly, the mean reactions change considerably once the lower is imposed.
Real rates are now lowered more (increased less) in response to negative
(positive) mark-up shocks.
8 Sensitivity Analysis
We now analyze the robustness of our ﬁndings by considering a number of
variations to our baseline calibration. Particular attention is given to the
sensitivity of the results to changes in the parameterization of the shock
processes.
8.1 More Variable Shocks
We estimated the shock processes using data for a time period that most
economists would consider to be relatively ‘calm’ especially when confronted
with the more ‘turbulent’ 1960s and 1970s. Since one cannot exclude that
more ‘turbulent’ times might lie ahead, it seems to be of interest to study
the implications of optimal policy with more variable mark-up and real rate
shocks. In this regard, this section considers the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to
an increase of the shock variances σ2
u and σ2
g above the values of our baseline
parameterization in table 1.
Increasing the variance of mark-up shocks we ﬁnd that the results are
remarkably stable. This holds even when setting the variance of σ2
u threefold
above its estimated value. Average output and (annual) inﬂation are slightly
positive, but both are yet below 0.01%. Moreover, zero nominal rates occur
with the same frequency and persistence as for the baseline parameterization
of table 1.
22The picture changes somewhat increasing the variance of real rate shocks.
While average output remains virtually unaﬀected, average inﬂation and the
average frequency and persistence of zero nominal rates do change, albeit to
diﬀerent degrees. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 10, that depicts the reaction
of these variables when the variance of real rate shocks is increased up to
threefold above that of the baseline calibration.43 Average inﬂation and
the average persistence of zero nominal rates change only in minor ways.
Instead, as real rate shocks become more variable the average frequency of
zero nominal rates increases sharply.
Moreover, as can be observed in the lowest panel of ﬁgure 10, the average
welfare losses generated by the zero lower bound increase markedly with the
variance of the real rate shock process. While for the baseline calibration
the additional average losses of the zero lower bound over and above those
generated by the stickiness of prices is in the order of 1%, once the variance of
real rate innovations is threefold the additional losses surge to roughly 33%.
This shows that the welfare eﬀects of the zero lower bound are sensitive to
the variance of the assumed real rate process.
Note that the eﬀects of the variability of shocks on the average level of
output and inﬂation diﬀer considerably from those reported in earlier contri-
butions. Uhlig (2000), e.g., reports negative level eﬀects for both variables
when analyzing optimal policy in a backward-looking model. Clearly, the
gains from promising positive values of future output and inﬂation cannot
show up in a backward-looking model. Similarly, Orphanides and Wieland
(1998) report negative level eﬀects for a forward-looking model considering
Taylor-type interest rate rules rather than optimal policy as in this paper.
Moreover, unlike suggested by Summers (1991), our results do not show
that it is necessary to target positive inﬂation rates so as to safeguard the
economy against hitting the zero lower bound.
8.2 Lower Interest Rate Elasticity of Output
Our benchmark calibration assumes an interest rate elasticity of output of
ϕ =6 .25, which seems to lie on the high side of plausible estimates of the
43This value is roughly consistent with the estimated variability of real rate shocks in the
period 1979:4-1995:2, i.e., the time span considered by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
The unconditional variance of the real rate shocks for 1979:4-1995:2 is about 2.5-fold that
for the period 1983:1-2002:4.
23intertemporal elasticity of substitution.44 Therefore, we also consider the
case ϕ =1that corresponds to log utility in consumption and constitutes
the usual benchmark parameterization in the real business cycle literature.
Table 2 presents the parameters values implied by table 1 assuming ϕ =1
instead of ϕ =6 .25. N o t et h a tt h ev a l u e so fλ and α also change as they
depend on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.45
We then re-estimated the shock processes with the new parameter values
and using the VAR-predictions to identify expectations. The autocorrelation
coeﬃcient for the mark-up shocks now turn out to be statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. Therefore, we set ρu equal to its point estimate in table 2.
The point estimate (standard deviation) of the autocorrelation of the real
rate shocks is now ρg =0 .882 (0.059). Since we still cannot reject ρg =0 .8 at
conventional signiﬁcance levels, we keep this value. As before, the standard
deviation σg is chosen so as to match the standard deviation of the estimated
real rate shocks.
Overall, our ﬁndings seem robust to the change in the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. In particular, the level eﬀects on average output
and inﬂation remain negligible. Moreover, required inﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s et o
a negative 3 standard deviation real rate shock is still in the order of 15
basis points annually. Even more importantly, the welfare losses generated
by the zero bound are rather small and in the order of less than one-half
percent of the losses generated by the stickiness of prices alone.
Parameter Economic interpretation Assigned value






α weight on output in the loss function 0.007
λ slope of the AS curve 0.057
ϕ real rate elasticity of output 1
ρu AR-coeﬃcient mark-up shocks 0.36
ρg AR-coeﬃcient real rate shocks 0.8
σu s.d. mark-up innovations (quarterly %) 0.171
σg s.d. real rate innovations (quarterly %) 0.294
Table 2: Parameter values (RBC calibration)
44As argued by Woodford (2003) this value may capture non-modeled interest-rate-
sensitive investment demand.
45See equations (2.19) and (2.22) in chapter 6 of Woodford (2003).
24Respect to the baseline, however, the lower bound is binding more fre-
quently, namely in about one quarter every 5 years on average. Binding real
rate shocks occur more often because the variance of the real rate shock pro-
cess implied by the RBC parameterization is about 45% higher than in our
baseline.46 However, binding shocks now generate lower welfare losses: the
steeper slope of the Phillips curve λ, shown in table 2, implies that inﬂation
reacts more strongly to output. As a result, the required amount of inﬂation
can be generated with less positive output gaps, which implies lower welfare
losses.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper determines optimal monetary policy under commitment taking
directly into account the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and
assesses its quantitative importance for the U.S. economy. One of the main
ﬁndings is that, given the historical properties of the estimated shock pro-
cesses for the U.S. economy, the zero lower bound seems neither to impose
large constraints on optimal monetary policy nor to generate large welfare
losses. Furthermore, we show that the existence of the zero lower bound
might require to lower nominal interest rates more aggressively in response
to adverse shocks than suggested by a model without lower bound.
Our ﬁndings raise a number of further issues. First, the omission of ﬁscal
policy clearly constitutes a shortcoming. The study of the potential role of
ﬁscal policy in ameliorating adverse welfare eﬀects entailed by the lower
bound seems to be of interest. Second, given the widespread belief that
lagged inﬂation is a major determinant of inﬂation, an issue that should
be addressed is the robustness of our ﬁndings to the introduction of lagged
inﬂa t i o ni nt h eP h i l l i p sc u r v e .
Finally, the central bank’s credibility is key for our results. The use of
expected inﬂation is unavailable to a discretionary policymaker, as there is
no incentive to implement promised inﬂation ex-post. The zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates, therefore, may generate signiﬁcant welfare losses
under discretionary policy, an issue that we explore in a companion paper,
Adam and Billi (2003).
46Mark-up shocks also play a less marginal role, a negative shock in the order of 4
standard deviations now leads to a binding lower bound.
2510 Appendix
We prove here the claims of proposition 1 (REE with Zero Bound) reported

























For it ≡− r∗ the model is then given by



























one can rewrite (18) as
M0e zt = M1Ete zt+1 + vt (19)
In a REE we have
Ete zt+1 = e zt+1 + ηt+1 (20)
where the forecast error ηt+1 is a martingale diﬀerence series. Substituting
(20) into (19) delivers the equilibrium law of motion
e zt+1 = Ae zt − Bvt − ηt+1,
where A = M−1
1 M0 and B = M−1
1 .A si se a s yv e r i ﬁed, A has one unstable
eigenvalue e1 > 1
β and one stable eigenvalue e2 ∈ (0,1).
Now express the forecast error ηt+1 as a combination of the fundamental
innovations and sunspot innovations, i.e.,
ηt+1 = −Cεt+1 − Dγt+1,
26where the sunspots γt+1 are a 2 by 1 martingale diﬀerence sequence, while
C and D denote arbitrary matrices. We then have
e zt+1 = Ae zt − Bvt + Cεt+1 + Dγt+1. (21)
Since the matrix B has full rank, the shocks vt will put e zt on the unstable
subspace of A,e v e ni fC and D would restrict εt+1 and γt+1 to lie on
the stable subspace. Since the eigenvector associated with the explosive
eigenvalue is of the form





for some e>0, e yt and e πt will diverge into opposite directions. This proves
the existence of a continuum of locally explosive (sunspot) REE.
We now consider stationary solutions. For the reasons discussed above,
the only way the solutions (21) can be stationary is if there is a common
factor in the lag polynomials that allows to eliminate the term Ae zt.R e w r i t e
(21) as
(I − AL)e zt+1 = −Bvt + Cεt+1 + Dγt+1
= −Bvt + C(vt+1 − Rvt)+Dγt+1
=( I − (B + CR)C−1L)Cvt+1 + Dγt+1 (22)








The previous equation implies that C = Γ, where Γ is given by equation
(15). From (22) it then follows that






If D projects the sunspots γ on the unstable manifold of A then these solu-
tions are again explosive with yt and πt diverging into opposite directions.
Now suppose the eigenspace of D is restricted to the stable manifold of
27A. The solutions (23) are then stationary. The subspace generated by the
eigenvector associated with the stable eigenvalue of A is







where both entries of − → e 2 are positive. The matrix D then has a represen-
tation of the form D = − → e 2·(d1,d 2) for some constants d1 and d2.C h o o s i n g
st =( d1,d 2) · γt, φ = e2,w=
−e2β+ϕλ+β
ϕ , and applying the deﬁnition of e zt
causes (14) and (23) to be equivalent.
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Figure 2: Residual autocorrelations with 2 s.d. error bounds for an unre-
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Figure 3: Identiﬁed shock processes
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Figure 4: Optimal policy responses (baseline calibration)















Figure 5: More aggressive easing with lower bound (baseline calibration)
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Figure 6: Mean response to ±3 s.d. real rate shocks (baseline calibration)























Figure 7: Persistence of zero interest rates (baseline calibration)
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Figure 8: Asymmetric real rate response with lower bound (3-fold variance
of real rate shocks)
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Figure 9: Mean response to ±3 s.d. mark-up shock (3-fold variance of real
rate shocks)

















































































Figure 10: Sensitivity to the variance of real rate shocks
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